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INTRODUCTION
In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,1 a sharply divided
Supreme Court held that officials at a public institution might require a
student religious group to admit all-comers from the student body,
including those who disagree with its beliefs, as a condition of being a
recognized student organization.2 Put another way, the Court declared
that the government, through university officials, might force religious

† General Counsel & Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. This Article is
adapted from William E. Thro, Undermining Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 295 EDUC. L.
REP. 867 (2013). Professor Thro writes in his personal capacity and his views do not necessarily
represent the views of the University of Kentucky.
1 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
2 Id. at 2978.
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groups to choose between compromising their values and receiving
benefits that other student groups receive as a matter of constitutional
right.3
While Christian Legal Society remains the controlling
constitutional rule until explicitly overruled,4 there are significant limits
on the decision. First, in many instances, state law—whether in the
form a state constitutional provision or a state statue—protects the
rights student religious organizations to exclude non-believers. In other
words, state law may require the opposite result of Christian Legal
Society.
Second, a 2012 decision, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,5 establishes that religious groups
have a right of religious autonomy—absolute discretion to determine
whom its leaders and, by extension, its members will be. This
constitutional guarantee of religious autonomy is contrary to Christian
Legal Society. Third, a 2013 decision, Agency for International
Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc.,6 revives
and redefines the unconstitutional conditions doctrine—government
may impose conditions that define the program, but may not impose
conditions that reach outside the program—so that a religious group
may not be forced to surrender its religious autonomy rights as
condition of receiving recognition and funding. Each of these limits is
explained in more detail below.
I. STATE LAW LIMITS CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY
Because State Constitutions often are more protective of individual
liberty,7 a student group may have a state constitutional right to exclude
3 Although most public institutions allow student groups to exclude those who disagree with
the group’s objectives or do not share the group’s interests, Christian Legal Society involved a
policy forbidding any student organization from discriminating for any reason. Under this “allcomers policy,” the Young Democrats had to allow Republicans to join; the Vegetarian Society
had to include carnivores; and the Chess Club had to allow members who would prefer to play
checkers.
Yet, most public universities allow student organizations to discriminate based on ideology
or interest. The Young Republicans get to exclude Democrats, the Vegetarian Society gets to
exclude carnivores, the Chess Club gets to exclude those who would prefer to play checkers, and
Greek organizations get to exclude those who do not fit in. If a University allows non-religious
organizations to exclude those who do not share the group’s values, then it will have a difficult
time forcing religious organizations to admit those who reject the faith. But see Alpha Delta ChiDelta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 800 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012)
(holding that state university may require religious groups to admit dissenters even those secular
groups are allowed to exclude dissenters).
4 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237-38 (1997); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
5 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
6 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013).
7 A.E. Dick Howard, The Renaissance of State Constitutional Law, 1 EMERGING ISSUES IN
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those who disagree with the group’s views.8 Indeed, since the Burger
Court’s decisions prompted a revival of state constitutional law in the
early 1970’s,9 “it would be most unwise these days not also to raise the
state constitutional questions.”10 Although the issue apparently is one
of national first impression, it would not be surprising if a state court
determined that its State Constitution prohibited the government from
indirectly forcing an organization to admit members who disagreed with
the organization’s objectives.11 Moreover, state Religious Freedom
Restoration Acts12 prohibit government from imposing a substantial
burden on the free exercise of religion unless there is a compelling
governmental interest pursued through the least restrictive means.13 To
the extent that a student group’s membership policies are the result of
religious belief, these state laws seem to prohibit government from
indirectly forcing the inclusion of dissenters. Finally, a few States,
acting in direct response to Christian Legal Society, have passed statutes
guaranteeing the religious autonomy of student religious groups. 14 In
sum, with respect to student religious organizations, state law may
prohibit what Christian Legal Society permits.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1, 14 (1988).
8 State Constitutions are fundamentally different from the National Constitution—the
National Constitution is a grant of power and the state constitutions are limitations on power.
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Education, 458 A.2d 758, 785 (Md. 1983); Board of
Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 366 n. 5 (N.Y. 1982). Thus, the presumptions concerning
legislative authority are reversed. Congress may not act unless it can identify a specific
enumerated power, but the State Legislature may act unless there is an explicit restriction. See
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000); Almond v. Rhode Island Lottery Comm’n,
756 A.2d 186, 196 (R.I. 2000).
9 See A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger
Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976).
10 William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 502 (1977).
11 Indeed, after the U.S. Supreme Court diminished religious freedom in Smith, several state
courts held that the State Constitutions provided greater protection for religious freedom. See
Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge Of Allegiance, And Religious Liberty:
Avoiding The Extremes, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 211–12 (2004) (discussing cases).
12 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§41-1493 to -1493.02; Conn. Gen. Stat. §52-571b; Fla. Stat.
§§761.01-.05; Idaho Code §§73-401 to -404; 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 35/1-99; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 446.
Mo. Stat. §§1.302-.307; N.M. Stat. §§28-22-1 to 28-22-5; Okla. Stat. Tit. 51, §§251-258; 71 Pa.
Cons. Stat. §§2401-2407; R.I. Gen. Laws §§42-80.1-1 to -4; S.C. Code §§1-32-10 to -60; Tenn.
Code § 4-1-407; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code §§110.001-.012; Utah Code §§ 63l-5-101 to -403;
Va. Code §§ 57-1 to -2.02.
13
See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Freedom After Gonzales, 55 S.D. L. REV. 467, 476
(2011); James W. Wright, Jr., Note, Making State Religious Freedom Restoration Amendments
Effective, 61 ALA. L. REV. 425, 426 (2010).
14
See Idaho Code 33-107D; Ohio Rev. Code § 3345.023; Virginia Code § 23-9.2:12.
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II. THE RELIGION CLAUSES LIMIT CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY
Two years after Christian Legal Society, in Hosanna-Tabor, the
Court rendered a decision that seems to expand the associational rights
of student religious groups. First, the Court recognized the First
Amendment gives “special solicitude” to religion and religious
organizations: “We cannot accept the remarkable view [espoused by the
Obama Adminstration] that the Religion Clauses have nothing to say
about a religious organization's freedom to select its own [leaders].”15
Second, the Court declared that the Free Exercise Clause secures a
religious organization’s right to choose its own leaders: “By imposing
an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause,
which protects a religious group's right to shape its own faith and
mission through its appointments.”16 Third, the Court found that the
Establishment Clause prohibited government interference with a
religious organization’s ecclesiastical decisions. 17
In sum, Hosanna-Tabor establishes that religious groups have a
right of religious autonomy—absolute discretion to determine whom its
leaders will be. Logically, if an organization can restrict its leadership to
those who adhere to the faith’s basic principles, then the organization
ought to be able to impose a similar requirement on membership.
Consequently, the necessary inference of Hosanna-Tabor is that
religious organizations, through the Religion Clauses, have greater
associational freedoms than their secular counterparts. A student
religious group has a constitutional right to exclude those who disagree
with its basic faith tenets.

III. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE LIMITS
CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY
Hosanna-Tabor confirms that student religious organizations enjoy
additional rights, but many institutions may be tempted to require that
student religious organizations surrender those rights as a condition of
receiving recognition or funding. This is essentially what happened in
Christian Legal Society—the student religious group was forced to
choose between recognition and preserving its theological integrity.
Alliance for Open Society precludes such ultimatums. Specifically,
while government may impose conditions that define the limits of the

15

Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
Id.
17 Id.
16
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particular program, the government may not impose “conditions that
seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the
program itself.”18 A state university’s program of recognizing and
funding student organizations ensures that “students have the means to
engage in dynamic discussions of philosophical, religious, scientific,
social, and political subjects in their extracurricular campus life outside
the lecture hall.”19 The limits of such a program may well require that
organizations allow non-members to attend their events. However,
requiring groups to compromise their beliefs and their message by
admitting non-believers is to leverage speech outside the contours of the
program itself.
After Alliance for Open Society, a public institution may not force
religious groups to surrender the religious autonomy rights recognized
in Hosanna-Tabor. This is so for three reasons. First, the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine applies to religious autonomy
rights. Second, the doctrine encompasses any form of government
subsidy, including recognition and funding of a student organization.
Third, requiring a student religious group to compromise its religious
autonomy rights as a condition of receiving funding or recognition is
unconstitutional. Quite simply, the condition of surrendering religious
autonomy does not define the purpose of recognizing or funding student
groups; it regulates the exercise of constitutional rights outside those
purposes.

CONCLUSION
Christian Legal Society was a “serious setback to freedom,”20 but it
does not destroy the religious liberty of student religious organizations.
In many instances, state law protects the ability of student religious
organizations to exclude non-believers. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s
subsequent decision in Hosanna-Tabor confirms that all religious
organizations, including student religious organizations, have the right
to choose their leaders and, by extension, their members. Finally,
Alliance for Open Society precludes public university from requiring a
student religious organization to surrender its religious autonomy rights.

Alliance for Open Soc’y, 133 S. Ct. at 2328.
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233 (2000).
Christian Legal Soc’y, 110 S. Ct. at 3020 (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Scalia &
Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
18
19
20

